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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue No. 1: Did the lower court err in failing to grant Hillside's motion for summary
judgment dated March 16, 2001 where Rite Aid never responded to said motion, thereby
admitting pursuant to Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501 Hillside's allegation that it mailed the
January 21, 1997 letter to Rite Aid's predecessor? Furthermore, should the Court have
proceeded to hear Hillside's unlawful detainer action and ruled thereon in favor of Hillside
in light of Judge Hanson's remarks at trial that a finding that the January 21,1997 letter was
mailed to Rite Aid's predecessor would have been dispositive in favor of Hillside?
Standard of Review: Correctness. Because entitlement to summary judgment is a
question of law, a reviewing court accords no deference to the lower court's resolution of the
legal issues presented. A reviewing court determines only whether the lower court erred in
applying the governing law and whether the lower court correctly made a determination as
to the presence of disputed issues of material fact. Glover ex rel. Dyson v. Boy Scouts of
America. 923 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Utah 1996).
Issue No. 2: Did the lower court err in finding for Rite Aid at trial in light of
paragraph 24 of the Lease, which specifically requires Rite Aid to send notices and rent to
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the same address, in light of the September 2 letter, and in light of the totality of the evidence
indicating that Rite Aid knew or should have known where to send the lease renewal notice?
Standard of Review: Clearly Erroneous. These issues entail a review of the lower
court's findings of fact based on the evidence presented at trial, rendering the clearly
erroneous standard appropriate. State v. Finlavson, 2000 UT 10, If 6, 994 P.2d 1243.
Issue No. 3: Did the lower court err in noting at trial that even if Rite Aid sent its
lease renewal notice to the incorrect address, that error was the result of an honest and
justifiable mistake, that Hillside presented no evidence showing Rite Aid was negligent in
exercising its option to renew, and that Rite Aid would have prevailed based on language in
the Utah Supreme Court case Utah Coal and Lumber Rest., Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors
Unlimited (2001 UT 100, 40 P.3d 581)?
Standard of Review: Correctness. The issue of whether a party's failure to properly
renew a lease constitutes a mistake is a question of law, rendering a correction of error
standard of review appropriate. State v. Finlavson, 2000 UT 10, ^ 6, 994 P.2d 1243.
Issue No. 4: Did the lower court err in awarding Rite Aid its attorney fees where the
lease agreement provides that fees "shall be borne by the party adjudged by the court to have
violated any of the terms or provisions of this Lease" and Hillside's purported violation was
the pursuit of its unlawful detainer action? Furthermore, did the lower court err in awarding
Rite Aid its full attorney fees where Rite Aid employed the services of two lawfirmsand two
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experienced senior partners and where the litigation was relatively simple and did not present
novel legal issues?
Standard of Review: Patent Error or Clear Abuse of Discretion. The issue of whether
a lower court's award of attorney fees was reasonable is subject to the patent error or clear
abuse of discretion standard. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-501 provides:
(2)(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion.
All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported
by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the
purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing
party's statement of disputed facts.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a final order and judgment entered by the Honorable Timothy
R. Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County on January 29, 2003,
finding that Rite Aid, as tenant, had properly exercised its option to renew a lease
agreement entered into with Hillside, as landlord. R. at 1041-1043.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AS FOUND BY LOWER COURT
1.

On or about May 6, 1974, Hillside Plaza Associates ("HPA"), as landlord,

entered into a written Lease Agreement ("Lease") with Skaggs Companies, Inc.
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("Skaggs"), as tenant, in which HPA leased to Skaggs retail space located at 2378 East
7000 South, Salt Lake City, Utah (uthe Property"). R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact«[ 5.
2.

Rite Aid is the successor-in-interest to Thrifty Payless, who was the

successor-in-interest to Skaggs. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact ^ 6.
3.

Hillside Plaza, Ltd. d/b/a Hillside Plaza Properties ("Hillside") is the

successor-in-interest to HPA. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, % 7.
4.

American Drug Stores, a previous successor-in-interest to Skaggs,

guaranteed the performance under the Lease of any successors to, assignees of, or
subtenants under, its interests. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, f 8.
5.

The original lease term began on October 6, 1975, and was to expire on

January 31, 2001 unless Rite Aid gave Hillside timely written notice of Rite Aid's intent
to renew the Lease. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, ^ 9.
6.

At some point not disclosed by the record, Hillside hired Commerce

Properties Management Corporation (UCPMC") to perform property management
functions for the Property. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, ^ 10.
7.

On March 19, 1992, CPMC sent a form letter (Trial Exhibit 2) giving Rite

Aid's predecessor-in-interest the following notice:
Many of you have continued to deliver rental payments and other mail to
our former address. Effective March 20, 1992 our brokerage company is
moving from their location at 275 East S. Temple to their new offices. In
the future all rental payments and mail for [Commerce Properties] should
be addressed as follows:
4

Hillside Plaza Limited
Commerce Properties Management Corp.
5282 South 320 West, Suite D-100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, 1f 11.
8.

In or about September of 1996, Hillside removed CPMC as the property

management company of the Property and replaced it with Hillside Management. R. at
1078; T. at 176.
9.

On September 2, 1996, John Johnson of Hillside Management sent a form

letter (Trial Exhibit 3) to Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest Thrifty Pay less, informing it
that "the property management responsibilities for Hillside Plaza Shopping Center have
been assumed by Annette Johnson of Hillside Management/' The letter also mentioned
several capital improvements that Hillside Management had planned for the shopping
center. It further instructed Thrifty to wCplease mail your future rent payments as follows:
Hillside Plaza Shopping Center
c/o Hillside Management
P.O. Box 900511
Sandy, Utah 84090"
R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, ^ 12.
10.

Although the September 2 letter was not sent by registered or certified

mail, Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest received and acted on the letter soon after
September 2, 1996, and placed the letter in its lease file. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact,
113.
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11.

The September 2 letter did not specifically reference where to send "mail"

or "other mail". R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, 1j 14.
12.

At the time the September 2 letter was sent. Hillside Management had

taken over all of the property management duties from the prior property management
company, CPMC. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact 1 15.
13.

From 1996 to 1999, Hillside Management communicated to Rite Aid at

least seven times that items such as tax payments, correspondence and invoices, were to
be sent to the Hillside Management address. R. at 1078; T. at 188-190.
14.

From December 1996 to January 2000, Rite Aid sent approximately twelve

items, including letters, reports, and legal notices, to the Hillside Management address set
forth in the September 2, 1996 letter. R. at 1078; T. at 184-188.
15.

On March 21, 1997 Rite Aid wrote Hillside (Trial Exhibit 4), requesting

that all future legal notices be sent to one address, and that all future non-legal
correspondence such as billings be sent to a different address. R. at 958-967; Findings of
Fact, T| 16.
16.

Rite Aid sent Trial Exhibit 4 to Hillside via the address of the prior

property management company, CPMC. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, ^ 17.
17.

Hillside Management received Trial Exhibit 4 shortly after March 21,

1997. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, H 18.
18.

The Lease provides, at ^| 2:
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OPTION TO EXTEND: Tenant, at its option may extend the term of
this Lease for not to exceed four separate and additional consecutive
periods of 5 years each. Each such extension shall be exercised by
giving written notice to Landlord at least 180 days prior to the
expiration of the original term hereof or any such extended term.
Upon such exercise, this Lease and the Lease Agreement shall be
deemed to be extended without the execution of any further lease
[or] other instrument.
Consequently, Rite Aid had to give Landlord written notice of Rite Aid's exercise of the
renewal option not later than August 4, 2000, which date was 180 days prior to the
expiration of the Lease on January 31, 2001. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, 1} 19.
19.

On June 21, 2000, Rite Aid sent, via certified mail, return receipt

requested, its notice of renewal of the Lease (Trial Exhibit 5) to the address of the prior
property management company: Hillside, c/o CPMG, 5282 South 320 West, Suite D, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84107. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, ^ 20.
20.

CPMC received Rite Aid's renewal notice on June 29, 2000. R. at 958-

967; Findings of Fact, ^ 21.
21.

Ellen Long of CPMC received the renewal notice but could not say with

certainty at trial whether she forwarded the renewal notice on to Hillside Management or
attempted to return it to Rite Aid. However, Ms. Long testified that she believes she
"probably" or "likely" forwarded it to Hillside Management. R. at 1077; Tr. at 91-92.
22.

John Johnson of Hillside Management testified that neither Hillside

Management nor Hillside received a copy of the renewal notice until approximately six
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weeks after the lease renewal deadline had passed. R. at 1078; T. at 173; R. at 1077; T.
at 112.
23.

The first time either Hillside or Hillside Management received a copy of

the renewal notice was on or about September 20, 2000, when counsel for Hillside
provided it to John Johnson of Hillside Management after it had been provided by
counsel for Rite Aid. R. at 1078; T. at 173.
24.

Sometime after the August 4, 2001 renewal date had passed, Hillside,

through counsel, advised Rite Aid's counsel Cynthia Meyer, that Rite Aid had failed to
exercise the option as the Lease required. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, 1} 37.
25.

Trial Exhibit 55 contains a January 21, 1997 letter from Annette Johnson of

Hillside Management to Lu Strong of Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest. R. at 1078; T.
at 189.
26.

This letter stated that:
Hillside Plaza is under new management. ... Please change your
records to send future correspondence and invoices to: [Hillside
Management address].

R. at 1078; T. at 189.
27.

At trial, John Johnson of Hillside Management testified that a copy of the

January 21, 1997 letter, which was part of Trial Exhibit 55, was kept in Hillside's Rite
Aid lease file in the ordinary course of business. R. at 1078; T. at 179-180.
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28.

At trial, Annette Johnson of Hillside Management was not called as a

witness and thus there was no testimony from Annette Johnson about the mailing of the
January 2L 1997 letter to Lu Strong. R. 1079; T. at 282; R. at 958-967; Findings of
Fact, H 25.
29.

The trial court expressed great concern over the authenticity of the January

21, 1997 letter and ruled that Hillside had not met its burden of proving that Hillside
Management mailed said letter. Thus, the trial court completely disregarded the January
21, 1997 letter as evidence. R. 1079; T. at 282-284; R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, <j
27.
30.

In writing the September 2 letter, Hillside Management intended to change

the mailing address for all purposes from CPMC to Hillside Management. R. 1079; T. at
284-285; R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact f 28.
31.

The trial court ruled that Hillside Management could have written the

September 2 letter in such a way as to more clearly and unequivocally change the mailing
address for all types of notices. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact, 1} 37.
32.

It is not uncommon in the commercial leasing industry for landlords and

tenants to establish multiple addresses for various types of correspondence. R. at 958967; Findings of Fact, If 31.
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33.

The phrase "property management" does not have any standard or generally

recognized meaning in the commercial leasing industry. R. at 958-967; Findings of Fact,
1132.
34.

On or about December 21, 2000, Rite Aid moved for summary judgment.

R. at 75-77.
35.

On or about March 16, 2001, Hillside submitted a memorandum opposing

Rite Aid's motion for summary judgment. R. at 355-434.
36.

Simultaneously, Hillside filed its own motion for summary judgment. In its

supporting memorandum, Hillside introduced several "undisputed facts". Undisputed
Fact No. 4 included the following text:
Subsequent to September 2, 1996, Hillside sent Rite Aid or its
predecessor-in-interest seven separate written notices of property
management's new and substituted address, two of which notices were
sent by certified mail. Furthermore, the notice dated January 21, 1997
requests Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest to "change your records to
send future correspondence and invoices to' the new address.
R. at 352-354; 355-434. This fact was supported by the Affidavit of John Johnson dated
February 6, 2001. R. at 184-265.
37.

Rite Aid never responded to Hillside's motion for summary judgment. See

Record.
38.

At the relevant hearing, the lower court denied Rite Aid's motion for

summary judgment. R. at 470-473. At that hearing, the court specifically granted Rite
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Aid additional time in which to file an opposing memorandum to Hillside's motion for
summary judgment, but again Rite Aid failed to file any response. R. at 470-473.
39.

When Hillside submitted its motion for summary judgment for decision,

Rite Aid thereafter filed a motion to strike Hillside's motion. R. at 474-476; 477-479.
40.

The lower court summarily denied Rite Aid's motion to strike, noting that

Rite Aid's actions were inappropriate and explaining that Rite Aid's motion to strike did
not "excuse its failure to file a timely response to Hillside's motion." R. at 529-531.
41.

In Rite Aid's own motion for summary judgment and supporting affidavits.

Rite Aid never controverted Hillside's contention that it sent the January 21, 1997 letter
to Rite Aid's predecessor. R. at 67-74; 75-77; 78-95; 438-468.
42.

On May 31, 2001, the lower court denied Hillside's Cross Motion for

Summary Judgment, despite Rite Aid never having filed a response, stating that "there are
factual issues concerning [Rite Aid's] conduct which preclude summary judgment in
favor of Hillside. R. at 529-531.
43.

At the conclusion of the trial, the lower court specifically concluded that:
At trial, Hillside relied on the January 21, 1997 letter which, as a
matter of law, would have been dispositive of the issues at trial in
favor of Hillside if Hillside could establish that it sent it to Rite Aid's
predecessor, and that Rite Aid's predecessor had received it.

R. at 1079; T. at 281-284; R. at 958-967; Conclusions of Law, ^ 2.
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MARSHALING OF THE EVIDENCE
On appeal, Hillside contends that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient
to support the lower court's decision. Thus, Hillside is obligated to marshal all of the
evidence purportedly supporting the decision and then show that such evidence cannot
support the lower court's decision. See Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 18 (Utah 1988).
At trial. Rite Aid's evidence consisted primarily of the testimony of four individuals Lawrence Gelman, Ellen Long, John Johnson, and Robert Baker - and several letters and
other documents that were presented as trial exhibits. In looking at the totality of this
evidence, it is clear that the lower court's decision was not supported by such evidence.
Robert Baker was called as an expert for Rite Aid to discuss notices in the
commercial leasing industry, based on his experience as an attorney for Albertson's, a
grocery chain retailer. He testified that as between landlord and tenant, there are some
communications that can be characterized as formal, and others as informal. Informal
communications include items of everyday business, such as the tenant informing the
landlord that the parking lot needs to be painted. Informal communications can consist of
writings or telephone calls. Typically, everyday business items do not involve a rush or a
deadline, nor are there consequences for a failure to act. R. at 1078; Tr. at 134-136.
Baker testified that, on the other hand, formal communications involve items
governed by the lease. There are consequences when these kind of notices are not
provided. Formal notices have to be sent strictly according to the lease requirement for
12

the sending of notices. A lease renewal notice is an example of a formal notice. R. at
1078; Tr. at 135-36. While all leases have addresses for formal notices, not all leases
have specific addresses for informal notices. R. at 1078; Tr. at 137.
Baker testified that, in his opinion, the July 22, 1999 letter from Hillside
Management to Bernard Reth, landlord liaison for Rite Aid, did not constitute a legal
notice changing Hillside Plaza, Ltd.'s address for legal notices because it was not sent to
the correct Rite Aid individual or address set forth in the lease. R. at 1078; Tr. at 138.
Additionally, Baker stated that in his opinion, Hillside Management's letter of September
2, 1996 properly changed the address for where rent should be paid but not for any other
purpose. While that letter states that as of September 2, 1996 "the property management
responsibilities for Hillside Plaza Shopping Center have been assumed by Annette
Johnson of Hillside Management", in Baker's opinion the term "property management
responsibilities" is unclear and has no generally accepted meaning in the commercial
leasing industry. R. at 1078; Tr. at 140. This testimony directly controverted Mr. Baker's
deposition testimony taken a day earlier in which Mr. Baker admitted that the September
2. 1996 letter did give Rite Aid sufficient notice as to where to send all kinds of notices.
R. at 1078; Tr. at 145-46.
Baker further opined that, despite the language of the September 2, 1996 letter.
Rite Aid was correct in sending its renewal notice to CPMC. R. at 1078; Tr. at 141.
Furthermore, Rite Aid acted reasonably in doing so, since the September 2 letter only
13

specifically mentions rent but nothing about written formal notices. Finally, Baker stated
that if Rite Aid did read the September 2 letter incorrectly, in his opinion it was an honest
mistake. R. at 1078; Tr. at 143.
In his deposition, Baker testified that as an attorney for Albertson's, it was his
practice to look through the relevant lease file for a "notice letter" prior to sending a lease
renewal notice to the landlord. Baker explained that by "notice letter", he meant a letter
changing the address to which future notice should be sent. Baker testified that he
considered the September 2, 1996 letter to constitute a "notice letter" properly changing
Hillside Plaza's address to which future notices should be sent. R. at 1078; Tr. at 144146. Despite this testimony, the next day at trial Baker made a sudden about-face, stating
that since the September 2 letter only mentions rent, in his opinion it was reasonable for
Rite Aid to send its renewal notice to CPMC. R. at 1078; Tr. at 141. At best, such
testimony should be disregarded as unreliable.
Ellen Long testified that at all relevant times, she was the office manager of
CPMC. R. at 1077; Tr. at 81. Whenever certified mail was delivered to CPMC, the
receptionist, Donna Brijs, would sign for it, stamp the outside, and bring it to Heather
Long, who would bring the certified item, unopened, to Ellen Long. R. at 1077; Tr. at 8385. At various times, CPMC would receive incorrectly addressed mail relating to
properties that CPMC no longer managed. R. at 1077; Tr. at 85. Generally, Long would
forward such mail on to the correct property management companies. Although the
14

forwarding process would continue sometimes for several months, at some point it would
be discontinued and Long would return such mail to the sender. R. at 1077; Tr. at 85-86.
It was not typical for Long to continue forwarding mail to the correct addressee for
a period of years. However, since she and John Johnson were friends, she could have
continued forwarding mail to him at Hillside Management. R. at 1077; Tr. at 86, 89.
Long has no specific recollection as to whether she forwarded Rite Aid's June 21,
2000 renewal notice on to Hillside Management or whether she returned it to Rite Aid.
However, she testified that, in her best judgment, she "probably would have" forwarded it
on to Hillside Management. R. at 1077; Tr. at 90-92. Long is certain that she would not
have thrown the renewal notice away. R. at 1077; Tr. at 91.
Lawrence Gelman testified that, as the vice-president and real estate attorney for
Rite Aid, he personally oversaw the renewal of all of Rite Aid's leases with various
landlords, including the renewal of the lease at issue in this case. R. at 1077; Tr. at 24,
26. Gelman testified that the data Rite Aid maintains regarding its landlords is kept in
various lease files, and that any new contact or notice information regarding said
landlords is entered into the company's computerized system, known as PIMS. R. at
1077; Tr. at 30-31, 42-43.
Gelman also testified that in March of 1997, Rite Aid sent all of its landlords a
letter, via certified mail, indicating that in the future, the landlords were to send non-legal
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notices to a rent payables department address, and all legal notices to a separate address.
R. at 1077; Tr. at 35.
Gelman stated that he sent various gross sales reports, percentage rent reports, and
other correspondence and documents to Hillside Management because he did not consider
those kinds of items to be legal notices but routine management correspondence. R. at
1077; Tr. at 60. He believed that such items were not part of the administration of the
lease and the failure to send such items to Hillside would not constitute a default under
the lease. R. at 1077; Tr. at 60.
On July 22, 1999, Hillside Management sent Bernard Reth of Rite Aid a letter.
The letter stated the following:
On July 19, 1999,1 received your letter dated July 8, 1999 which you
incorrectly addressed. I notified Rite Aid of the correct address for Hillside
Plaza, Ltd. in September 1996. Please update your records to the correct
mailing address as follows: [Hillside Management address].
R. at 1077; Tr. at 53. Gelman testified that, to his knowledge, Mr. Reth did not notify
Rite Aid that it should send future legal notices to Hillside Management. R. at 1077; Tr.
at 53. Although he did not offer any plausible explanation, Gelman further testified that
he would not expect Mr. Reth to notify Rite Aid of Hillside Management's request for
address change, even though Mr. Reth's title was "landlord liaison." R. at 1077; Tr. at 52,
54.
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Gelman further testified that on or about June 21, 2000, Rite Aid mailed a notice
of renewal to Hillside Plaza in care of CPMC at CPMC's address. R. at 1077; Tr. at 36.
That renewal notice was sent certified mail. R. at 1077; Tr. at 36. Gelman stated that he
sent the lease renewal notice to CPMC because at the time he reviewed the lease file and
PIMS systems to determine the letter's destination, the only address on file for Hillside
Plaza was that of CPMC. R. at 1077; Tr. at 36-37. The CPMC address was also the one
listed as being the current notice address in Rite Aid's PIMS system; Gelman admitted in
his testimony, however, that Rite Aid's PIMS system is not 100% accurate. R. at 1077;
Tr. at 66-67.
Gelman testified that the renewal notice Rite Aid sent on June 21, 2000 had a
space whereon Hillside was to acknowledge receipt by signing and returning the
acknowledgment to Rite Aid. R. at 1077; Tr. at 48. Although Gelman admitted that Rite
Aid never received the acknowledged return, Gelman testified that he ignored that fact
and was not concerned because Rite Aid seldom receives acknowledgments back from
landlords. R. at 1077; Tr. at 48-49.
Exhibiting a similarly cavalier attitude, Gelman testified that at the time he mailed
the renewal notice, the September 2, 1996 letter from Hillside Management to Rite Aid
was inside the lease file in front of him but that he did not review that letter for possible
instructions on where to send the renewal notice. R. at 1077; Tr. at 39, 43-44, 63-64.
Had Gelman taken a moment to review the September 2 letter, there can be no question
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that he would have sent Rite Aid's notice of lease renewal to the proper address. At the
very least, considering the financial importance of the lease renewal, Gelman certainly
would have, or should have, inquired about where the notice was to be sent. But he
simply did not bother to review the letter in the file. Such an admission is equivalent to
the admission of the lessee's principal in Utah Coal that, having simply missed the
deadline to exercise the option, ,f'[i]t wasn't for any reason other than I was busy. We
were busy doing other things in our business, wearing other hats.'" Utah Coal and
Lumber Rest., Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT 100; 40 P.3d 581,1J 4.
Relying on that very statement, the Utah Supreme Court in Utah Coal concluded that the
lessee had admitted that "its own negligence caused its exercise [of the option] to arrive
late. Although the lessee claimed that its conduct was an "honest and justifiable mistake,"
the Utah Supreme Court held that it was negligence and, on that basis, concluded that the
lessee "is not entitled to equitable excuse." Id. at ^f 9.
John Johnson testified that he authored the September 2, 1996 letter to Rite Aid's
predecessor-in-interest. R. at 1077; Tr. at 97. Johnson testified that while the September
2 letter asks Rite Aid's predecessor to send future rent payments to Hillside Plaza in care
of Hillside Management, it did not specifically state that Hillside Plaza's address was
changing for all purposes or for legal notices or other kinds of mail. R. at 1077; Tr. at
101. Johnson did not send the September 2, 1996 letter via certified mail as required by §
24 of the lease. This is because only two of Hillside Management's nineteen tenants at
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the time had lease provisions requiring legal notices to be sent by certified mail, one of
which was Rite Aid. R. at 1077; Tr. at 103-04.
On or about March 21, 1997, Rite Aid sent a letter indicating that, in the future, all
legal notices should be addressed to one Rite Aid address, and all non-legal notices to
another. R. at 1077; Tr. at 104-05. The March 21, 1997 letter was sent to CPMC and
forwarded on to John Johnson at Hillside Management. R. at 1077: Tr. at 104-05. After
receiving the March 21, 1997 letter, Hillside Management sent various notices to the nonlegal notice address, and some notices to the legal notice address designated therein. R. at
1077; Tr. at 105. Hillside Management never formally informed Rite Aid that it should
have sent the March 21, 1997 letter to Hillside Management instead of CPMC. R. at
1077; Tr. at 105-06, 110.
In July of 1999, Mr. Bernard Reth of Rite Aid sent a communication to Hillside in
care of CPMC, which was forwarded on to Hillside Management. R. at 1077; Tr. at 10607. Hillside Management responded on July 22, 1999 by telefaxing a letter to Mr. Reth
and informing him to send all future notices to the Hillside Management address. R. at
1077; Tr. at 107. Hillside Management never mailed such a letter to the address for legal
notices specified in Rite Aid's March 21, 1997. R. at 1077; Tr. at 110. Johnson testified
that after September 2, 1996, Hillside Management received a total of two mail items that
were forwarded from CPMC. R. at 1077; Tr. at 111. However, he testified that, without
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any question, he did not receive Rite Aid's renewal notice from CPMC. R. at 1077; Tr. at
108, 112.
Johnson testified that Rite Aid is currently paying $2.24 per square foot to rent its
space in the shopping center. Johnson believed that the market value for the Rite Aid
space in the year 2000 was around $9.00 to $10.00 per square foot. R. at 1077; Tr. at
113-14. Johnson is not a corporate officer of Hillside Plaza, Ltd. R. at 1077; Tr. at 118.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court's denial of Hillside's motion for summary judgment was improper
because the state of the record at the time showed it was undisputed Hillside notified Rite
Aid that Rite Aid needed to send all rent, correspondence, and invoices to the Hillside
Management address. Thus, summary judgment should have been granted in favor of
Hillside, and the lower court should have proceeded to hear Hillside's unlawful detainer case.
Furthermore, the lower court erred in finding for Rite Aid at trial because: (1) the September
2, 1996 letter gave Rite Aid adequate notice of Hillside's change of address; (2) the totality
of the evidence shows that Rite Aid knew or should have known where to send the renewal
notice; and (3) Rite Aid was required to strictly comply with the lease renewal provision and
is not entitled to equitable relief under the Utah Coal and Lumber Restaurant case.
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ARGUMENT
I.

EVEN WHEN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE
LOWER COURT, THE MARSHALED EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE LOWER COURT'S RULING
As appellant, Hillsidefirsthas the duty to marshal all of the evidence in support of the

lower court's ruling and then demonstrate that such evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the lower court, is insufficient to support the ruling. Beesley v. Harris, 883 P.2d
1343, 1347 (Utah 1994). To do so, the appellant must "present, in fastidious order, every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial" supporting the lower court's findings, and
"after constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence,... ferret out a fatal flaw in
the evidence." Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp.. 29 P.3d 668, 676 (Utah App. 2001). In the
case at bar, the lower court concluded that, in mailing the lease renewal notice to CPMC,
Rite Aid sent the notice to the correct address. The evidence supporting this ruling came
from the testimony of the four Rite Aid witnesses - Robert Baker, Ellen Long, Lawrence
Gelman, and John Johnson. The testimony of these four individuals, looked at in the light
most favorable to Rite Aid, fails to support the trial court's ruling.
A.

The Testimony of Robert Baker Was Inadmissible and Fails to Support
the Lower Court's Ruling.

Much of the lower court's ruling was based on the testimony of Rite Aid's expert
witness, Robert Baker. Baker testified that generally, between landlords and tenants, two
kinds of notices are sent - legal notices and informal communications. Baker testified that
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informal communications involve items of everyday business, such as the tenant informing
the landlord that the parking lot needs painting. In Baker's opinion, everyday business items
do not involve deadlines; nor are there consequences for a failure to timely act. On the other
hand. Baker viewed formal notices as involving items specifically governed by the lease.
According to Baker, these latter notices must be set strictly according to the lease
requirement for sending notices. Baker would classify a lease renewal notice as an example
of a formal notice.
Baker testified that the September 2 letter was a formal notice that changed the
address for where rent should be paid but not for any other purpose. Baker testified that,
even though the September 2 letter states that "the property management responsibilities for
[Hillside] have been assumed by Annette Johnson of Hillside Management", the term
"property management responsibilities" is unclear and has no generally accepted meaning
in the commercial leasing industry. Thus, Baker concluded, despite the language of the
September 2 letter, Rite Aid was correct in sending the lease renewal notice to CPMC, the
former property management company. The lower court mirrored this reasoning in its
holding.
Baker's testimony consisted of two main parts: (1) the adequacy of the September 2
letter for purposes of changing the address for legal notices; and (2) the adequacy of the
September 2 letter for purposes of changing the address for rent payments. Whether a legal
notice complies with lease requirements and the interpretation of legal documents such as
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notice letters are questions of law to be decided by courts. These items clearly fall outside
the province of an expert witness, who serves merely to assist the trier of fact in determining
factual matters outside the scope of knowledge of the average person. See Utah Rule of
Evidence 702. However, an expert cannot testify as to questions of law, which are normally
reserved for the exclusive province of the finder of fact.
Interpretation of a written contract is usually a question of law for the court.
... Even where some ambiguity exists in the contract, resolution of the
ambiguity is still a question of law for the court
Overson v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co.. 587 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1978). Furthermore, the
issue of "whether a written notice was adequate" is an issue of law reserved for courts.
Benton v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 500 N.W.2d 158, 160 (Minn. App. 1993).
Baker was thus improperly used as an expert witness to testify as to whether the
September 2 letter gave Rite Aid adequate notice, as required by the lease, of Hillside's
change of address. That is the court's responsibility. Furthermore, it was not within Baker's
province to interpret the meaning of terms contained in a legal document. Thus, the lower
court improperly allowed, and then relied upon, Baker to give an opinion as to his
interpretation of the notice requirement.

Baker's testimony that the term "property

management responsibilities" contained in the September 2 letter was unclear and had no
generally accepted meaning in the commercial leasing industry was inadmissible for the
same reasons. At trial, Hillside objected to Baker's testimony on these issues as calling for
the ultimate legal conclusion in the case. R. at 1078; Tr. at 142. Because Baker improperly
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testified regarding obvious questions of law and the ultimate legal decision in this case, his
testimony should not have been allowed or considered by the lower court.
Although the testimony of Robert Baker should not have been allowed under the
circumstances, it should also have been disregarded since Baker was fully impeached at trial.
On direct examination, Mr. Baker testified that while the September 2 letter properly
changed the address for where future rent should be paid, it did not adequately change the
address for any other type of communication. Baker further testified that because the
September 2 letter was unclear, Rite Aid was correct in sending its renewal notice to CPMC.
R. at 1078; Tr. at 141.
This trial testimony directly controverted Mr. Baker's own testimony offered under
oath just one day earlier in a deposition conducted by counsel for Hillside. At trial, counsel
for Hillside and Mr. Baker had the following exchange:
Counsel:

"Do you remember giving me precisely the opposite opinion
regarding Exhibit 3, the September 2, 1996 letter yesterday
when I asked you about this?"

Mr. Baker:

u

No."

Counsel for Hillside then gave Mr. Baker a copy of Mr. Baker's deposition. Counsel stated
that he would read certain questions from the deposition and asked Mr. Baker to read his
corresponding responses from the witness stand.
Counsel:

"[Y]ou told me that it might be a typical practice when you
were an attorney for Albertson's to look through the lease file
prior to sending a lease renewal notice and look for a notice
letter. Do you recall telling me that?"
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Mr. Baker:

"Yes?"

Counsel:

"What do you mean by a notice letter?"

Mr. Baker:

"It's a letter that changes the address where notices will be
sent."

Counsel:

"And ... if you were flipping through a lease file and you saw
[the September 2 letter] would you consider that to be a
notice letter?"

Mr. Baker:

"Change of address letter?"

Counsel:

u

Mr. Baker:

"Yes."

Yes."

R. at 1078; Tr. at 145-146. Just one day before his contradicting trial testimony, Mr. Baker
testified that the September 2 letter in fact did give Rite Aid adequate notice that Hillside had
changed its address with respect to all notices, including legal notices such as the lease
renewal letter later mailed by Rite Aid to CPMC. There appears to be no reasonable
explanation for the change in Mr. Baker's position, other than the possibility of some afterthe-fact discussions regarding the deposition testimony and its potential effect on the
outcome of the trial. Counsel for Rite Aid never even attempted to explain this glaring
contradiction in testimony. In any event, Mr. Baker's testimony was inconsistent, as well as
inappropriate, with regard to the issues of contract interpretation and the adequacy of the
September 2 letter.
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B.

The Testimony of Ellen Long Did Not Change the Notice Requirement and
Fails to Support the Lower Court's Ruling.

Ellen Long testified that CPMC often received incorrectly addressed mail relating to
properties CPMC no longer managed. Generally, Long would forward this mail on to the
correct recipient for some time. After several months, Long would begin to return this mail
to the sender. Long also testified that Rite Aid sent the lease renewal notice at issue to
CPMC, although she had no specific recollection as to whether she forwarded the renewal
notice on to Hillside Management or returned it to Rite Aid. However, because she is a
friend of John Johnson of Hillside Management, Long testified that she "probably would
have" forwarded the renewal notice on to Hillside Management, even though CPMC had not
managed the Hillside property for nearly four years.
Long's testimony, even when looked at in the light most favorable to Rite Aid, clearly
lends no support to the lower court's ruling. Long admitted that she had no specific
recollection of what she actually did with the lease renewal notice. That she "may have" or
"probably would have" forwarded it on to Hillside Management is simply not enough. John
Johnson's testimony on cross-examination that he did not receive Rite Aid's lease renewal
notice until six weeks after the renewal deadline had passed was clear and unambiguous:
Rite Aid Counsel:

Johnson:

And yet less than one year later, you claim that you did
not receive [the lease renewal notice], correct?
That is not a claim. In fact, I did not receive it.
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Rite Aid Counsel:

Johnson:
Rite Aid Counsel:

Johnson:

Commerce Properties forwarded to Hillside Management Rite
Aid's Notice of Renewal that's contained in Exhibit 5, didn't
it?
No.
Are you claiming under oath that Hillside Management did
not receive that Notice of Renewal?
I am claiming under oath without reservation Hillside
Management did not receive that notice.

R. at 1076; T. at 108; 112. Ellen Long's testimony that she "probably would have" sent the
lease renewal notice on to John Johnson cannot, under any circumstances, overcome John
Johnson's testimony that, "without reservation Hillside Management did not receive that
notice." Furthermore, the testimony of Ellen Long does not change the fact that, pursuant
to the lease and the September 2 letter, Rite Aid was required to send the lease renewal notice
to Hillside Management.
C.

The Testimony of Lawrence Gelman Did Not Change the Notice
Requirement and Fails to Support the Lower Court's Ruling.

Even the most favorable testimony of Lawrence Gelman, Rite Aid's vice president
and senior real estate attorney, does not support the lower court's ruling that Rite Aid sent
the lease renewal notice to the correct address. Gelman attempted to renew this Utah lease
from his office at Rite Aid headquarters in Pennsylvania.

Gelman testified that, in

preparation of renewing the lease, he reviewed Rite Aid's electronic database of lease
addresses known as PIMS. Gelman also testified that he reviewed portions of the lease file
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for guidance on where to send the renewal notice. After reviewing PIMS and the lease file,
Gelman mailed the lease renewal notice to CPMC, the property management company from
four years earlier. This summarizes all of the favorable testimony from Gelman on the
subject.
Gelman's actions directly contradicted both the relevant lease provision for notices
and the notice given by the September 2 letter. Paragraph 24 of the lease states that only one
address is to be used for all notices:
Any notice or demand given or served by either party to this Lease to the
other shall not be deemed to have been duly given or served unless in
writing and forwarded by certified or registered mail (return receipt
requested), postage prepaid, addressed as follows: [Landlord and Tenant
addresses]. Rent shall be paid to Landlord at the address set forth in this
article. ... The person and the place to which notices are to be mailed may
be changed by either party by written notice to the other party.
(Emphasis added). Thus, the lease requires that legal notices and rent must be sent to a
single address. The lease did not allow Hillside to change the address for rent and maintain
a different address for notices. Nevertheless, that is exactly what the lower court ruled —
that the September 2 letter changed the address for rent, but not for legal notices. If Rite Aid
interpreted the September 2 letter as splitting the single Hillside address into two discrete
addresses, such an interpretation was unreasonable, given the clear directive of paragraph
24 and Hillside's inability to unilaterally modify that lease requirement.
The lower court's reliance on Gelman's testimony was also erroneous in light of the
September 2 letter. In September of 1996, Hillside replaced its property management
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company, CPMC, with a new property management company, Hillside Management.
Hillside realized its obligation under paragraph 24 of the Lease to inform all shopping center
tenants, including Rite Aid, of the management change and the corresponding change in
mailing address. For this purpose, Hillside Management sent the September 2 letter.
The September 2 letter began. "Effective September 1, 1996, the property
management responsibilities for Hillside Plaza Shopping Center have been assumed by
Annette Johnson of Hillside Management."

The letter emphasized that Hillside

Management "should be able to ensure a high level of attention to the needs of the tenants
of Hillside Plaza," and detailed several property improvements to be overseen by Hillside
Management. Finally, the letter indicated that Rite Aid should mail future rent payments to
Hillside Management. Thus, in compliance with paragraph 24 of the lease, the September
2 letter clearly apprised Rite Aid that the address for notices had changed to the new
property management company. The language and context of the letter clearly indicate that
Hillside Management had taken over all of CPMC s responsibilities as property manager,
which included the collection of rent payments. And again, the testimony of Lawrence
Gelman was not supportive of the lower court's ruling. The interpretation of paragraph 24
of the lease and the September 2 letter are questions of law.
Even if the September 2 letter could be construed as ambiguous or unclear, it at least
put Rite Aid on notice of a significant change in communicating about the lease. As a
consequence, anyone acting on behalf of Rite Aid in dealing with the lease was on notice

29

to inquire, particularly in determining where to send an important letter like a lease renewal
notice. Yet Gelman's best testimony is that he relied on his paralegal's input into the PIMS
file and documents in the lease file provided by Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest to
determine where to send the lease renewal notice. R. at 1077; Tr. at 30-31; 36-37; 64-67.
Gelman may or may not have reviewed paragraph 24 of the lease. R. at 1077; Tr. at 43-45.
Nor did Gelman search through the lease file for potential change of address notices sent
pursuant to paragraph 24. R. at 1077; Tr. at 43-46; 64-67. Gelman did not even read the
September 2 letter, which was in the lease file in front of Gelman at the time Gelman sought
to renew the lease. R. at 1077; Tr. at 39, 43-44, 63-64. Thus, Gelman's best testimony
cannot support the lower court's ruling that Gelman sent the lease renewal notice to the
correct address.
D.

The Testimony of John Johnson Does Not Support the Lower
Court's Ruling.

John Johnson, president of Hillside Management, admitted that the September 2 letter
does not specifically state that Hillside's address was changing for all kinds of notices.
Johnson also testified that he did not send the September 2 letter by certified mail, as called
for in the lease. When Rite Aid sent a letter to CPMC in 1997, which was ultimately
forwarded on to Hillside Management, Johnson did not again inform Rite Aid that the letter
had been incorrectly addressed. In 1999, Bernard Reth, identified by Rite Aid as the
landlord liaison for the lease in question, sent a second letter to CPMC, which was also
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forwarded on to Hillside Management. While Johnson subsequently wrote Reth, informing
him to send all future notices directly to Hillside Management, Johnson never sent such a
corrective letter to the address Rite Aid had previously specified for legal notices. Instead,
he responded directly to Reth's address at Rite Aid.
The foregoing is all of Johnson's testimony supporting the lower court's ruling.
While the September 2 letter does not use the specific term "legal notices", it clearly
indicates that Hillside Management was assuming all property management responsibilities.
Moreover, as noted earlier, paragraph 24 of the lease requires that rent must be sent to the
same address used for legal notices. Thus, the omission of the term "legal notices" is
irrelevant and cannot support the lower court's ruling.
The fact that the September 2 letter was not sent certified, as called for by paragraph
3 of the lease, does not render the notice defective. See generally, D. & L. Enters., Inc. v.
Davenport, 507 P.2d 373 (Utah 1973). Utah courts tend to relax rigid requirements
governing method of delivery where actual receipt is acknowledged. In D.&L. Enterprises,
the lessee hand-delivered a notice of intent to renew to the landlord, even though the lease
specified that such notices should be mailed. The court reversed a summary judgment in
favor of the lessor, noting:
The [lessee] says ... [she] gave proper notice of renewal, - with which we
agree, because it was hand-delivered next door to the place designated for
such notice, and plaintiffs urgence that it should have been mailed under
the terms of the lease, recommends itself to a possible absurd result and
another factual matter as to actual and/or reasonable notice ....
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Id. at 374. A Washington court faced with virtually identical facts ruled in the same fashion
in General Tel. Co. v. C-3 Associates. 648 P.2d 491 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982), explaining that:
[Generally speaking any method of transmission of notice of renewal of a
lease ma\ be employed which is effective to bring such notice home to the
lessor and serves the same function and purpose as the authorized method.
... This is true although the lease requires notice to be made in a particular
way.
Id. at 492 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). These cases stand for the proposition that
an alternative method of notice is valid where it in fact accomplishes the same function or
purpose as the method authorized in the lease. The primary purpose of sending notices by
certified or registered mail is "to ensure receipt." Bd. of Comm'rs v. Turner Marine Bulk,
629So.2d 1278, 1283 (La. Ct. App. 1993). Thus, Hillside's failure to adhere to a strict lease
technicality is immaterial if Rite Aid in fact received the September 2 notice and had an
opportunity to act on it (i.e. update its address records).
Rite Aid's receipt of the September 2 notice is undisputed. Lawrence Gelman
testified that Rite Aid maintained a copy of the September 2 notice in its lease file. R. at
1077; Tr. at 39,43-44,63-64. From the time it received the notice, Rite Aid had almost four
years to update its records before the Lease term expired. This would be the case even had
the notice been sent certified or registered mail. "Where adequate notice is in fact given and
its receipt is not contested, technicalities of form may be overlooked." Turner Marine, 629
So.2d at 1283. Because the "function and purpose" of the authorized method of delivery was
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served and because actual receipt is undisputed, Hillside's September 2, 1996 letter satisfies
the Lease notice requirement of certified mail.
Finally, the fact that on the two occasions Rite Aid sent notices to CPMC. Hillside
Management never sent a notice to Rite Aid's legal notice address informing Rite Aid of the
mistake, lends no support to the lower court's ruling. Indeed, the September 2 letter,
contained in Rite Aid's lease file, had already satisfied Hillside's duty to provide notice.
Moreover, Johnson did mail a response to Bernard Reth, who was identified to Johnson as
Rite Aid's landlord liaison, asking Reth to update Rite Aid's address file. As discussed
more fully below, Hillside informed Rite Aid of the correct address on at least twenty
different occasions.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE,
PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 4-501,
RITE AID RECEIVED NOTICE WHERE IT SHOULD SEND FUTURE
LEGAL NOTICES
A.

Standard of Review.

On or about March 16, 2001, Hillside filed a motion for summary judgment which
the lower court denied. Said motion contained a statement of undisputed facts dispositive
to Hillside's case. The lower court's decision to deny Hillside's motion was a ruling of law.
Estate Landscaping & Snow Removal Specialists v. Mountain States Tel, and Telegraph Co.,
844 P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 1992). This Court should review a lower court's decision to grant
or deny a motion for summary judgment "for correctness without deference to the trial

court's ruling." Petersen v. Bd. of Educ. of Davis County School Dist.. 855 P.2d 241. 242
(Utah 1993).
B.

The Lower Court Erred in Denying Hillside's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

On or about December 21, 2000, Rite Aid filed its motion for partial summary
judgment. R. at 75-77. In response, Hillside filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.
R. at 352-354. The accompanying memorandum served the dual purpose of opposing Rite
Aid's motion and supporting Hillside's cross-motion. R. at 355-434. As required by Utah
R. Jud. Admin. 4-501 ("Rule 4-501"), Hillside included in its memorandum a section
responding to Rite Aid's "undisputed facts." Additionally, Hillside introduced several new
undisputed facts. Hillside's Undisputed Fact No. 4 included the following text:
Subsequent to September 2, 1996, Hillside sent Rite Aid or its predecessor-ininterest seven separate written notices of property management's new and
substituted address, two of which notices were sent by certified mail.
Furthermore, the notice dated January 21, 1997 requests Rite Aid's
predecessor-in-interest to "change your records to send future correspondence
and invoices to" the new address.
This fact was supported by a copy of the January 21, 1997 letter, which was attached to the
Affidavit of John Johnson dated February 6, 2001 as Exhibit "B". R. at 184-265.
Pursuant to Rule 4-50L Rite Aid was required to "file and serve upon [Hillside]
within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and
all supporting documentation." That deadline passed, and Rite Aid filed nothing. In the
meantime, the lower court denied Rite Aid's motion for summary judgment. R. at 470-473.
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However, the lower court specifically granted Rite Aid additional time in which to file a
memorandum opposing Hillside's motion for summary judgment. Again Rite Aid failed to
file an opposing memorandum or to controvert Hillside's Undisputed Fact No. 4 in any way.
When Hillside finally submitted its motion for summary judgment for decision. Rite Aid
quickly filed a motion to strike Hillside's motion. R. at 474-476; 477-479. The lower court
summarily denied Rite Aid's motion to strike, noting that Rite Aid's actions were
inappropriate and explaining that Rite Aid's motion to strike did not "excuse its failure to file
a timely response to Hillside's motion." R. at 529-531. Nevertheless, the lower court also
denied Hillside's unopposed motion for summary judgment on the basis that "there are
factual issues concerning [Rite Aid's] conduct which preclude summary judgment in favor
of Hillside ...." R. at 529-531.
Under Rule 4-501, "[a]ll material facts set forth in the movant's statement and
properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the
purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's
statement." Since Rite Aid never filed a memorandum opposing Hillside's cross-motion,
then as a matter of law each undisputed fact set forth therein by Hillside must be deemed
admitted by both parties. This includes Undisputed Fact No. 4, which was properly
supported by the Affidavit of John Johnson. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 4-501 it was
undisputed that on January 21, 1997, Hillside sent Rite Aid's predecessor the abovereferenced letter.
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Notably, there is nothing in Rite Aid's earlier motion for summary judgment or
supporting affidavits to contradict Undisputed Fact No. 4. R. at 67-74; 75-77; 78-95. The
Affidavit of I. Lawrence Gelman, supporting Rite Aid's motion for summary judgment, was
silent on the matter. The affidavit merely states that:
The Lease Files for the Property contain nothing dated after March 21, J 997
instructing Rite Aid (or PLAC [Payless Acquisition Corporation] before it)
to send notices or other non-rental correspondence to any address other than
the address at 5282 South 320 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, c/o CPMC.
R. at 67-74 (emphasis added). Because no evidence was presented to the contrary at trial,
Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest was deemed to have received the January 21, 1997 letter.
There is no question that the January 21,1997 letter was a key piece of evidence. At
the end of the trial, the court stated:
At trial, Hillside relied on the January 21,1997 letter which, as a matter of law,
would have been dispositive ofthe issues at trial in favor ofHillside if Hillside
could establish that it sent it to Rite Aid's predecessor, and that Rite Aid's
predecessor had received it.
R. at 958-967; Conclusions of Law, ^ 11 (emphasis added). See also R. at 1079; T. at 281284. According to the lower court's own legal determination, Hillside should have prevailed
on summary judgment nearly ten months earlier. Indeed, Hillside did prove that it sent the
January 21, 1997 letter to Thrifty PayLess. The testimony contained in the John Johnson
affidavit was never contradicted by Rite Aid and therefore must be deemed admitted
pursuant to Rule 4-501. Furthermore, Rite Aid never disputed that its predecessor-in-interest
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received the letter. Thus, Judge Hanson's own legal determination provides the basis under
which Hillside should have been awarded summary judgment.
III.

THE CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT RITE AID KNEW OR
SHOULD HAVE KNOWN WHERE TO SEND ITS RENEWAL NOTICE
Sometime in 2000, Rite Aid decided to exercise its option to renew the Lease.

Paragraph 2 of the Lease provides that to do so. Rite Aid must send written notice of its
intent to renew to Hillside at least 180 days prior to the expiration of the original term. Since
the original term was to end on January 31, 2001, Rite Aid was required to send its notice of
renewal to Hillside no later than August 4, 2000. This was not done. Instead, Rite Aid sent
its notice of renewal letter to CPMC, the property management company from four years
earlier. This mistake was inexcusable for the following reasons.
First, at the time Rite Aid sent its lease renewal letter, it maintained a copy of the
September 2, 1996 letter in its lease file. R. at 1077; Tr. at 39,43-44, 63-64. The lease file,
containing the September 2 letter, was in front of attorney Lawrence Gelman when he sat
down to prepare the lease renewal notice. R. at 1077; Tr. at 63-67. Second, from 1996 to
1999, Hillside wrote Rite Aid or its predecessor at least seven separate times informing Rite
Aid to send items such as future correspondence, invoices, and tax payments to the new
address and asking Rite Aid to update its records to the correct mailing address. R. at 1078;
T. at 188-190. During this nearly four-year span, Rite Aid received no correspondence of
any kind from CPMC. R. at 1078; T. at 191.
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Third, after the September 2, 1996 letter, Rite Aid mailed at least twelve non-rent
items including letters, reports, legal notices, and at least sixty (60) rent payments to the
correct Hillside Management address. R. at 1078; T. at 184-188. This demonstrates that
Rite Aid knew about the change in property management companies. Hillside Management's
assumption of the property management responsibilities, and where to send notices.
Fourth, in June of 2000 Hillside and Rite Aid were embroiled in two lawsuits separate
from this one, involving interpretation of various Lease provisions (one such case was before
Judge Henriod and is known as the "percentage rent" case; the other was before Judge
Hanson and dealt primarily with Rite Aid's selling of merchandise on the sidewalk in front
of the store — the "non-monetary default" case). R. at 1078; T. at 192-198. In the percentage
rent case, Rite Aid mailed written demands to the Hillside Management address and served
upon John Johnson a summons and complaint at Mr. Johnson's home. R. at 1078; T. at 193194. On June 20, 2000, one day before Rite Aid sent the lease renewal notice in this case,
Rite Aid counsel deposed John Johnson, the president of Hillside Management, in the nonmonetary default case. Rite Aid never deposed anybody from CPMC in that case. R. at
1078; T. at 196-198.
The reason for deposing John Johnson, rather than anyone from CPMG, was obvious.
Johnson of Hillside Management was the individual with whom Rite Aid had been dealing
since September of 1996, when CPMC had ceased management of or involvement with the
Hillside property. In the midst of the ongoing, heated, percentage rent litigation, Rite Aid
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never once sent a legal notice to CPMC or deposed a CPMC employee. R. at 1078; T. at
192-198. This is because Rite Aid knew that CPMC had had no relationship with Hillside
for almost four years. Yet incredibly, on June 21, 2000, the very day after Johnson was
deposed in the non-monetary default case. Rite Aid sent its notice of lease renewal to CPMC.
Finally, even if the evidence is deemed not to have established Rite Aid's actual
knowledge of where to send the lease renewal notice, the evidence does establish that Rite
Aid reasonably should have known that the Hillside Management address was the correct
destination. Hillside Management sent virtually exact replicas of the September 2 letter to
all of the shopping center's existing tenants, which at the time numbered nineteen. R. at
1078; T. at 198. All nineteen letters were received by the respective tenants. R. at 1078; T.
at 199. Of those nineteen tenants, Rite Aid was the only tenant that subsequently failed to
update its mailing records in response to the September 2 letter. Indeed, none of the other
eighteen tenants ever exhibited any confusion as to where to send legal notices after
receiving the September 2 letter. R. at 1078; T. at 203. This demonstrates that, for the
normal reasonable tenant, the September 2 letter adequately and clearly conveyed the
message that all future legal notices were to be sent to the Hillside Management address.
The evidence that Rite Aid was fully involved with Hillside Management, and not
with CPMC, in the ongoing lease litigation must be viewed in connection with the evidence
that Rite Aid actually did send at least seventy-two items of mail containing both rent and
other types of correspondence to Hillside Management between 1996 and 2000. Such
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continuous dealings with Hillside Management belie the claim that, of nineteen tenants, only
Rite Aid was ignorant of the import of the notice information provided in the September 2
letter. When the totality of such evidence is considered, it becomes clear that Rite Aid must
have actually known, or reasonably should have known, where the lease renewal notice was
to have been sent. Rite Aid simply mailed the lease renewal notice to the wrong place.
Therefore, the lower court's decision was not supported by the evidence and must be
reversed.
IV.

UNDER UTAH LAW, RITE AID MUST STRICTLY COMPLY WITH
THE LEASE RENEWAL PROVISION AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO
EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THIS MATTER
In Utah, if a tenant wants to exercise an option to renew a lease, it must strictly adhere

to the relevant renewal provision. Indeed, uwhen [an] optionee decides to exercise his
option he must act unconditionally and precisely according to the terms of the option."
Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1998) (quoting Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific
Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 640 (Utah 1984)). Furthermore, "the doctrine of
substantial performance cannot be used to avoid mandatory [option] provisions." Id. at 7071. Although substantial compliance is enough to satisfy bilateral contracts, "performance
of an option requires strict compliance?" Id. (emphasis added).
In the case at bar, the Lease required Rite Aid to send written notice of its intention
to renew to Hillside at least 180 days prior to the expiration of the Lease term. Rite Aid
failed to strictly comply with the option to renew clause, because Rite Aid mailed the notice
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to the incorrect address and Hillside received the notice nearly six weeks after the option
expiration date. (It came six weeks later only because Hillside counsel informed Rite Aid
counsel, in a separate lawsuit, that the lease had not been renewed. R. at 1078; T. at 173).
Therefore, under the Geisdorf strict compliance requirement, Rite Aid failed to renew the
lease.
Although the rule in Utah is strict compliance with the terms of lease renewal option
provisions, the Geisdorf Court did leave a small opening in the otherwise explicit strict
compliance doctrine, explaining that "there are instances in which deviation from strict
compliance may be equitably excused." Id. at 71. However, Geisdorfdid not "clearly set
forth when a court should equitably excuse an untimely exercise of an option." Utah Coal
and Lumber Restaurant, Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, ^[11; (Utah
2001); 40 P.3d 581 (emphasis added). In Utah Coal the Utah Supreme Court took the
opportunity to do just that, holding that the untimely exercise of an option is excusable only
in cases of fraud, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, mistake, and waiver. Id, at ^ |
13-14. In the instant case, as in the Utah Coal case, there has been no evidence of fraud,
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, or waiver, and the only possible basis for
equitable relief would be the issue of mistake.
"Mistake" in a non-legal sense, is a broad term that could be defined to mean any
error, however negligent. Equitable relief, however, should not be available in every
instance simply because a party has unintentionally or "mistakenly" (in the sense of
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inadvertently) failed to perform an obligation. For that reason, courts will not apply equity
to excuse tardy lease renewals "where the lessee's negligence, inadvertence, or neglect
caused the failure ...." 40 P.3d 581 at ^f 14. Indeed, "the consequences of a lessee's failure
to exercise an option, however uncomfortable they may be, are self-inflicted. Equitable
relief should not be used to extricate the lessee from the consequences brought about by the
lessee's own actions." Id.. In the case at bar, Rite Aid's problems were "self-inflicted" and
"brought about by the lessee's own actions." Hence, Rite Aid does not meet any of the
criteria for equitable relief. Id.
V.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RITE AID ITS
ATTORNEY FEES
A.

Rite Aid Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees Because Hillside Did Not Violate
the Lease Agreement.

Rite Aid is not entitled to attorney fees or costs under the relevant governing lease
provision. Paragraph 23 of the Lease states that "costs, including attorneys' fees, of any
action brought to enforce any of the terms or provisions of this Lease, shall be borne by the
party adjudged by the court to have violated any of the terms or provisions of this Lease"
(emphasis added). In Utah, courts tend to construe contractual attorney fee provisions very
narrowly. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). Thus, a
"prevailing party" or "party not in default" is not automatically entitled to attorney fees if
such language is not expressly included within the governing instrument. Trayner v.
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984).
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In the present case, the lower court awarded Rite Aid its attorney fees on the basis that
Hillside "violated the lease terms by contesting the validity of Rite Aid's renewal notice and
taking steps to evict Rite Aid from the premises through an unlawful detainer action." R. at
970-974. However, that finding was not based on any specific lease provision and, in fact,
was directly contrary to the evidence presented at trial. There is no such evidence that
Hillside "violated any terms or provisions of this Lease." In fact, Hillside did not receive a
timely lease renewal notice. Rite Aid was unlawfully detaining the premises. Simply
challenging the effectiveness of Rite Aid's renewal (which came six weeks late) did not
constitute the violation of any specific lease term. Such action may have inconvenienced
Rite Aid, but it did not violate Rite Aid's ability to peacefully possess the premises while the
litigation progressed. Indeed, Hillside never interfered with the day-to-day operations of the
Rite Aid store. Rite Aid has never claimed that it suffered from decreased customer inflow
or profits or that it sustained any other injury or damage on account of Hillside's actions.
Because Hillside did not violate any specific lease term, the lower court should not have
ordered Hillside to pay Rite Aid's attorney fees and costs.
B.

Rite Aid's Claimed Attorney Fees Are Unreasonable and Excessive.

The lower court also erred in the amount of fees awarded. Throughout the entire
litigation, Rite Aid employed the services of both Bruce Wycoff, of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook
& McDonough, and Cyndi Meyer, of Morgan, Meyer & Rice, both litigators and partners at
two established law firms. Shortly after trial, Rite Aid's combined counsel had billed 529.25
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hours, for a total bill of $85,511.75. R. at 1006-1110. However, Rite Aid is not
automatically entitled to all attorney fees it billed in litigating this case, especially if the
number of hours billed is unreasonably high. Indeed, "what an attorney bills or the number
of hours spent on a case is not determinative" of how much attorney fees to award an
attorney. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998). Instead, a court should
consider "[h]ow much of the work was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the
matter." Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
In determining whether the number of hours billed is reasonable, a court may consider
such factors as "the difficulty of the litigation" and "the efficiency of the attorneys in
presenting the case". Cabrera v. CottrelL 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). Another useful
tool in determining reasonableness could be to compare hours billed by opposing law firms.
Rite Aid clearly fails each of these tests, which supports Hillside's contention that Rite Aid's
requested attorney fees are unreasonable.
1.

The Litigation Was Not Complex.

This case does not encompass complex or novel legal issues. The primary issue was
merely whether Rite Aid, in context of the governing lease document, properly exercised its
option to renew the lease. The documentation at issue consisted of a lease agreement, several
items of correspondence, and some documents from Rite Aid's lease and computer files.
Both parties had early access to all of the key documents in the case, and the lower court was
merely asked to interpret those documents. Early in the case, both sides filed motions for
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summary judgment, determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact.
Litigation only required counsel to have a working knowledge of contract law and
commercial leases.
Nor did this case present unique legal issues. At least three recent Utah cases
involved similar fact patterns and issues. One such case, Geisdorf v. Doughty, was decided
before this litigation ensued. Two other cases interpreting and expanding on Geisdorfwere
certainly relevant when decided, but could not have reasonably caused Rite Aid to drastically
modify its trial strategy or delay in finding a suitable expert witness.
2.

The Use of Two Law Firms Was Inefficient.

Rite Aid used its legal resources inefficiently by employing the services of two major
law firms. From the outset of this case, both Ms. Meyer and Mr. Wycoff, and their
respective firms, served as local counsel for Rite Aid. It is true that a party in a lawsuit may
hire as many law firms as it wishes. Indeed, Rite Aid could have hired five law firms to
assist in this case. Perhaps utilizing several minds from several firms could have improved
upon the presentation of Rite Aid's claims. However, while utilizing five firms may have
constituted a valid trial strategy, it would be unreasonable to claim reimbursement for all
such attorney fees from Hillside.
In short, there was nothing inherently wrong with Rite Aid bringing in Mr. Wycoff
and his firm to assist Ms. Meyer in this litigation. Mr. Wycoff had an existing relationship
with Rite Aid and had certain expertise in matters involving landlord/tenant issues. R. at
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1006-1010. However, Ms. Meyer had already shown her ability to represent Rite Aid's
interests as sole local counsel. Indeed, prior to this case Ms. Meyer and her firm had already
handled two other cases involving these same parties. Hillside should not have to bear the
expense of a second law firm.
3.

Rite Aid Incurred More Attorney Fees Than Hillside.

Another test to determine the reasonableness of attorney fees is to compare the fees
incurred by opposing law firms in the same case. In this case, both parties faced identical
issues. Both parties had access to the same documents. Yet counsel for Rite Aid billed 88.25
hours more than counsel for Hillside. R. at 1006-1010. Rite Aid's attorney fees total
$85,511.75, one and a half times more than Hillside's attorney fees of $58,297.60. R. at
1006-1010. These numbers are a result of Rite Aid's inefficient and unreasonable use of two
law firms and two senior partners. Hillside should not have to bear the added expense of two
law firms.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should hold that the lower court erred in denying
Hillside's motion for summary judgment, hold that the order of the lower court be reversed,
and grant summary judgment in favor of Hillside. In the alternative, the Court should rule
that Rite Aid had adequate notice of Hillside's new address but failed to timely and properly
renew, and remand the proceedings to the lower court to allow Hillside to litigate its unlawful

46

detainer action. Finally, the Court should reverse the lower court's award of attorne\ fees
to Rite Aid.
DATED this ^_

day of June 2003.
KESLER & RUST

rcer
Ry^tjT^Fiancey
Attorneys for Hillside Plaza. Ltd.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered by the method indicated below two true
and correct copies of the foregoing in Case No. 20030129-CA. postage prepaid, this

3

day of June 2003 to:

y<

Bruce E. Wycoff

FEDERAL EXPRESS
u.s. MAIL
HAND DELIVERY
TELEFAX TRANSMISSION

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH

170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Cynthia K. C. Meyer
Morgan, Minnock & Rice, L.C.
12911 Long Tail Drive
Draper, Utah 84020
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ADDENDUM

LEASE AGREEMENT

THIS LEASE AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of the
day of
Mav 5
, 1974, between HILLSIDE PLAZA ASSOCIATES,
a partr.ersnip. ("Landlord"), and SKAGGS COMPANIES. INC.. a Delaware
Corporation, ("Tenant") , and is the lease agreement referred to in that certain
lease of even date herewith between the parties hereto covering the premises
(the "Premises") at 70tn South and 23rd East, Salt Lake County, Utah, consisting
of the outlined land area shaded in red and marKed "Skaggs" on tne plot plan
attached to said lease as Exnibit "A" which is located in the snooping center,
(the "Shopping Center 1 ) , the present boundaries of whicn are described on
Exhibit "B" attached to said lease. This lease agreement is made to supplement
and complete such lease and is to be aeemed a material part thereof for all
purposes and to tne same extent as if actually and fully set fortn therein (such
lease and this lease agreement being heremaiter collectively referred to as
the "Lease").
(1) PRELIMINARY TERM RENT. No rent shall be due or payable
during the preliminary term of this Lease except such as may be due pursuant
to the article entitled "COMMENCEMENT OF ORIGINAL TERM."
(2) ANNUAL RENT. Tenant agrees to pay Landlord during the
original term of this Lcdse *u annual rent of Fuly-Four Thousand Six Hunarea
Dollars ($54,600) in equal monthly installments of Four Thousand Five
Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($4,550) payable on or before the tenth day of each
calendar month for the current calendar montn. The annual rent installment
for any fractional calendar month at the beginning of the original term shall
be prorated and paid or. or before the tenth day of the calendar month following
commencement at the original term.
(3) PERCENTAGE RENT. On or before the first day of March
following each calendar year of the original term of this Lease, Tenant agrees
to mail or deliver to Landlord a statement, signed by one of its officers, showing
the acrual sales (computed as neremaiter provided) made m or from the Premises
during such year.
Should said sales as so computed exceed the minimum sales ba^e
of Three Million Six Hundred Forty Thousand Dollars ($3 ,640 ,000) m any
calendar year, Tenant agrees to pay Landlord as additional rent due hereunder
a sura equal to one and one-half percent (1-1/2%) of such excess. Payment
of such percentage rent, if any, shall be made on or before Marcn 1st of each
year for the preceding calendar year.
In computing its sales for purposes of this article, Tenant bhall
include the total gross amount realized as the result of retail bales of merchandise
and services rendered by Tenant and its successors, subsidiaries or affiliated
corporations in or irom the Premises, except thdt there snail not be included
in such computation tne following. (1) the purcnase price of all returned mcrchan
dise wnich is refunded or credited to the purchaser; (2) all receipts (including
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rent to be received from such reletting and such rent shall not be promptly
paid to Landlord by the new tenant, Tenant shall immediately be liable to pay
such deficiency to Landlord. If Landlord elects to terminate this Lease, written
notice to that eriec: specitying the elfective date of termination shall be given
by Landlord to Tenant and in such event, Landlord may recover from Tenant
all damages Landlord may incur by reason oi Tenant's failure to pay rent,
including the cost of recovering tne Premises and including the excess of the
annual rent reserved in this Lease for tne remainder of the original term (or
any extended term men in effect) over the then reasonable rental value of
the Premises for tne remainder of such term, all of which amounts shall be
immediately due ana pa>able by Tenant to Landlord.
(23) COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES. The costs, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, of any action brought to enlorce any of the terms or provisions
of tins Lease, shall be borne by the party adjudged by the court to have violated
any of the terms or provisions of this Lease
(24) NOTICES AND PLACE FOR PAYMENT OF RENT Any notice
or demand given or served by either party to tnis Lease to the other shall
not be deemed to have been duly given or served unless m writing and forwarded
by certified or registered mail (return receipt requested), postage prepaid,
addressed as follows:
To the Landlord at:

351 California Street
San Francisco, California 94104

To the Tenant at:

Post Office Box 658
Salt Laxe City, Utah 84110

Rent snail be paid to Landlord at the address set forth in this
article. No successor to Landlords interest shall be entitled to receive rent
payments until Tenant shall have been turnished with (a) a letter signed by
the grantor of sucn interest setting forth the name and address of the person
entitled to receive such rent and (b) a photostatic copy of tne deed or other
instrument by whicn such interest passed.
The person and the place to wnich notices are to be mailed may
be changed by either party by written notice to the otljer party
(25) PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS. Landlord agrees to construct
a building on the Premises in accordance with plans and specifications approved
in writing by Tenant but prepared at Landlord's expense. Tenant snail cooperate
with Landlord in the furnishing of all necessary information, plans and sketches
to show Tenant's requirements for such building. It on or before October 1, 1974,
final plans and specifications have not been approved by Tenant, Landlord or
Tenant may terminate this Lease by giving notice thereof to tne other party Upon
approval in writing of :\nal plans and specifications by Tenant, Landlord shall obtain a ouilding permit and diligently oroceed with the construction of the building
on the Premises. If such construction is not commenced on or before January
1, 1975, Tenant may terminate this Lease by giving notice thereof to Landlord.
If such construction is commenced prior to approval in writing by Tenant of
final plans and specifications, Tenant may at any time prior to the commencement
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Hillside M a n a g e m e n t
P.O. B o x 9 0 0 5 1 1
Sandy, U t a h 8 4 0 9 0
80L947-9130

September 2> 1996

Christopher Sloan
Property Accounting
Thrifty PayLess, Inc.
9275 S W Peyton Lane
Wilsonville, OR 97070
Re

^

u/>*

Hillside Plaza^hoppijig Center
PayLess St*

Dear Ms. Hammer,
Eflfectivc September I, 1996, the property management responsibilities for Hillside Plaza
Shopping Center have been assumed by Annette Johnson of Hillside Management With
the organization of Hillside Management, and with the assignment of this responsibility to
Annette, we should be able to ensure a high level of attention to the needs of the tenants
of Hillside Plaza. Annette can be reached at 801-947-9130
For theroonthof Seprember, 1996, Commerce Properties Management Corp. will forward
your rental payment to Hillside Management Please mail your future rent payments as
follows
Hillside Plajza Shopping Center
c/o Hillside Management
PO Box 900511
Sandy, UT 84090
Your rental payments should be made in accordance with the terms of your lease and must
be received no later than the due date specified in your lease.
You may be aware that the ownership of Hillside Plaza has recently refinanced its loan for
the shopping center In accordance with the terms of this new loan, several capital
improvement and repair projects will be underway during this faB and next spring The
most significant capita] improvement projects include* the planned addition of new sign
bands above the northeast shops and above the plaza shops; and extensive renovations to

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT
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Christopher Sloan
September 2,1996
Page 2 '
the plaza area. At thistimearchitect?, are in the process of designing, the renovations.
Upon completion of tie planning phase .we will encourage interested tenants to review the
plans. The most significant repair projects rachide: parking lot work; roof work; and
landscape improvements scheduled for next spring. We win make every effort to minimize
any inconvenience these projects may present for tenants and shopping center patrons.
Your input will be welcome both now and curing the coursfc of the projects. We are
certain you will be please with the encj result.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. If Annette can be of assistance in any wayr
please do hot hesitate.to contact her.

Sincerely,

JbhriS. Johnson
Asset Manager* •

c. RobBirdsley

Hillside Management
P.O. Box 900511
Sandy, UT 84090

January 21, 1997
Lu Strong
Thrifty Payless
9275 SW Peyton Lane
Wilsonville, OR 97070

Re:

Hillside Plaza, Salt Lake City, UT
Store m530

Dear Mr. Strong,
Please be advised that as of September 1, 1996, Hillside Plaza is under new management.
The ownership has not changed nor any contractual agreements by Hillside Plaza Please
change your records lo send mttiie coirespondence and invoices to

Hillside Plnza
c/o Hillside Management
P.O. Box 900511
Sandy, U T 84090
801947 9130
Thank you for your help,

/InattlC Js(u:
Annette Johnson
Property Manager

RITE
AID
D!

.

... ^

> MAILING ADDRESS
P.O. Box 1169
Camp Hill, PA 17001-1169
..

Rite Aid Corporation

• OFFICE ADDRESS
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st Johns R d

Camp Hill, PA 17001
CERTIFIED MAIL

•(717)730-8271

RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Z 075 085 574

07/08/1999
HILLSIDE PLAZA, LTD
C/O COMMERCE PROP. ,GMT. CORP.
5 2 S 2 SOUTH, 320 WEST, SUITE 'D
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 8 4 1 0 7

Re:

RITE AID #06143
HILLSIDE PLAZA S/C
SALT LAKE CITY, UT

Dear Property Manager:
The above referenced Rite Aid store was told by the Salt Lake City Fire Marshall to have the fire lane
marked (painted) and approriate signs posted. They were given two weeks (from 7/7/99) to have this
completed. The lease states that the Landlord is responsible for Common Area Maintenance, such as
this. Please make arrangements to have this completed no later than 7/21/99.
I appreciate your prompt attention to this matter and request notification when conditions have been
corrected. Should you have any questions or follow up comments, feel free to contact me at (717) 7308343 or fax (717) 975-8695.
Sincerely

.eerrjafd E. Rdth
indlord Liaison

cc Local Construction Manager
Market Manager #00028
Eve Bear, Esquire
Store Manager #06143
Store File
06143L01BR0708

Hillside Management
P.O. Box 900511
Sandy, UV 84090
801-947-9130

July 22, 1999

Store #06143
c/o Rite Aid Corporation
Attn Bernard E. Reth
POBox 1169
Camp Hill, PA 17001-1169

Re:

VIA FACSIMILE ONLY U 717975-8695

I lillside Plaza Shopping Center
Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Mr. Reth,
On July 19, 1999, I received your letter dated July 08, 1999, which you incorrectly
addressed. I notified Rite Aid of the correct address for Hillside Plaza, Ltd in September
1996. Please update your records to the correct mailing address as follows
Hillside Plaza, Ltd.
c/o Hillside Management
POBox 900511
Sandy, UT 84090
Please provide a copy of the notice from the Salt Lake Cily Fire Marshall wherein Rite
Aid was told to have the fire lane painted The fire lane has existed in front of the
premises with a painted red curd for nearly 25 years. Two other stores of similar and
larger size also occupy space at the shopping center with identical painted curbs. Neither
of the other stores report contact by the fire department directing repainting of their fire
lanes. In fact, I repainted the fire lanes at the entire shopping center less than a year ago.
The fire department has not contacted me although the fire department knows that I have
an office at the shopping center and that I represent the landlord
I believe the fire department is simply responding to your current store manager's defiance
of fire codes that prohibit parking and deliveries in fire lanes marked with red curbs. I
have also attempted to correct this problem through direct contact with your store
manager and delivery drivers, and newsletters delivered to your store. When those efforts
were unsuccessful I attempted to call your store manager's supervisor without receiving a

Bernaid E Relh
July 22, 1999
Page 2

returned call On May 20, 1999, I included this issue and other site based lease violations
in written correspondence addiessed to Allan Henning in Rite Aid's audit depaitment I
have attached an excerpt from my May 20, 1999, letter addressing site based lease
violations Rite Aid personnel at all levels have refused or ignored all of my elTorts to gain
Rite Aid's compliance When I received your letter I had already consulted Hillside
Plaza's attorney regarding a notice of default to Rite Aid addressing this and other RJte
Aid lease violations I have now directed Hillside's attorney to delay issuance of that
notice pending the outcome of this conespondence
I believe you can resolve the fire lane problem with proper direction to your store manager
prohibiting his use of the fire lane as a delivery and loading zone I sincerely hope as a
Landlord Liaison you will contact me to correct the other Rite Aid lease violations so that
legal action will not be necessary
f will be out of my office from July 23, 1999, through July, 31, 1999 1 look forward to
discussing these issues with you afiei August I, 1999
Sincerely,

John S Johnson
Asset Manager

_

* v a s Mj/F i
LEGAL DBttRTMENT

_

,/IW^

r~ mtFJ)fW§S/mrmrm

RO,BOX316S

Hamsburg. PA 17105
• GENERAL OFFICE
30 Hunter Lane
Camp Hill, PA 17011

• (717) 761-2633
•(717) $75-5*52 Fax

June 21, 2000

VIA CERTIFIED MAIL R.R.R.
Z 403 484 907

Hillside Plaza Ltd.
c/o Commerce Property Management Corp.
5282 South 320 West, Suite D
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Re:

Rite Aid #5143
23,78 East 7000 South
Salt Lake City, UT

Gentlemen;
Please be advised that THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC. hereby elects to exercise its option to
renew the Lease for the referenced premises. Our new terra will commence upon the expiration
of the present term, to wit: on or about February 1, 2001.
Kindly acknowledge your receipt of this notice by signing in the space provided below
and returning a copy of this letter in the postage paid envelope enclosed.
Very truly yours,
THRIFTY RAYLESS, INC.

I. Lawrence Gelman
Vice President and Seen
ELG:mh
Acknowledged:
Hillside Plaza Ltd.

Bv:

DEFENDANTS
EXHIBIT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a
California corporation, dba
RITE AID,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO.

000910098

Plaintiff,
vs.
HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD., a
California limited partnership,
dba HILLSIDE PLAZA PROPERTIES,
and COLLIERS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
a Utah general partnership,

-f r

t-v

Defendants.
HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD., a
California limited partnership,
dba HILLSIDE PLAZA PROPERTIES,

ssmwr ecu*'U~»inv Z *rt

Plaintiff,
vs.
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a
California corporation, dba
RITE AID; and AMERICAN DRUG
STORES, INC., an Illinois
corporation,
Defendants.

The Court has before it a request for decision filed by
defendant Hillside seeking a ruling on its cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment. The parties in this matter appeared before the Court on
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March 26, 2001, in connection with the plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.

At that time, the Court noted that

defendant Hillside had a pending cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,
However, the Court determined that this Motion was not ripe for
consideration because the other parties had not had an adequate
opportunity to respond to the Motion.

After hearing argument on

the plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court
denied

it after

determining

that

there were

factual

issues

concerning Rite Aid and its predecessors' conduct following the
September 2, 1996, notice, and whether this conduct was consistent
with an interpretation of the September 2nd notice as only being
operative with respect to rental payments, as opposed to all other
forms of notice.
Hillside filed its Notice to Submit on April

10, 2001,

indicating that its Motion for Summary Judgment is unopposed.

On

April 12, 2001, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Hillside's
Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that in light of the Court's
ruling at the March 26, 2001, hearing, Hillside's Motion must
necessarily be denied (stricken) . Hillside responded to the Motion
to Strike on April 16, 2001.
Since the Court did not rule on Hillside's Motion at the March
26, 2001, hearing, that Motion remained pending and should have
been responded to in a reasonable period of time. The plaintiff's
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Motion to Strike based on the presumption that the Court would
necessarily deny Hillside's Motion is inappropriate and does not
excuse its failure to file a timely response.

Accordingly, the

plaintiff's Motion to Strike is denied.
The

Court

next

considers

Hillside's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment. Although this Motion is technically unopposed, the Court
nevertheless denies the Motion because there are factual issues
concerning the plaintiff's conduct with respect to differentiating
correspondence based on its content after the September 2, 1996,
notice, which precludes summary judgment in favor of Hillside.
Accordingly, Hillside's Motion is denied.
Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare an Order consistent
with this Minute Entry decision and submit the same to the Court
for review and signature.
Dated this

day of May, 2001.

-

*

TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUN 1 7 2002
%

^W^fe cogwn-

B
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a
California corporation, dba
RITE AID,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO.

000910098

Plaintiff,
vs.
HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD., a
California limited partnership,
dba HILLSIDE PLAZA PROPERTIES,
and COLLIERS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
a Utah general partnership,
Defendants.
HILLSIDE PLAZA, LTD., a
California limited partnership,
dba HILLSIDE PLAZA PROPERTIES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a
California corporation, dba
RITE AID; and AMERICAN DRUG
STORES, INC., an Illinois
corporation,
Defendants.
The

Court

has

before

it

two

issues

pending

requiring

resolution relating to appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and attorney's fees.
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Hillside has filed an Objection to the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law prepared by counsel for Rite Aid. Hillside has
submitted its own version of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law. The Court has reviewed the Objections, the Response thereto,
as well as the respective Findings, and is satisfied that the
Objections Hillside has lodged are not well-taken and should be
overruled. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by
Rite Aid are consistent with the ruling this Court made following
the evidentiary portion of this trial.
The Court has signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law prepared by Rite Aid on a date contemporaneous with the date of
this Minute Entry decision.
The second issue, as noted above, concerns the entitlement to
attorneyfs fees.

Rite Aid seeks attorney's fees, and Hillside

argues that Rite Aid is not entitled to attorney's fees because
under the lease agreement while Rite Aid may have prevailed,
Hillside was not "adjudged by the court to have violated any of the
terms or provisions of its lease.1' Rite Aid contends that Hillside
violated the lease terms by contesting the validity of Rite Aid's
renewal notice and taking steps to evict Rite Aid from the premises
through an unlawful detainer action.

The Court agrees with the

analysis of Rite Aid and is satisfied that Hillside has violated
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the terms or provisions of the lease through its actions referred
to by Rite Aid and is therefore entitled to attorney's fees.
It appears there is a question as to the reasonableness of the
fees sought.

Counsel for Rite Aid has filed his Affidavit which

includes an hourly itemization of the fees requested.

The Court

also has the Affidavit of Cynthia K.C. Meyer regarding attorney's
fees and costs that also include an hourly itemization.

Hillside

objects to the amount of fees on the basis that the amounts sought
are not clearly delineated as to the work being performed and
further indicates that the amount charged, even if the work was
actually accomplished, is more than is justified in this case. The
Court is satisfied that a hearing will be required to determine the
amount of fees, wherein should Hillside's counsel wish to crossexamine either Ms. Meyer or Mr. Wycoff regarding the attorney's
fees they have requested, he may do so.

The Court takes the

Affidavits filed by Mr. Wycoff and Ms. Meyer as establishing prima
facie

entitlement to the fees requested.

The burden will then be

upon counsel for Hillside to demonstrate inappropriateness of the
bills through cross-examination or other testimony at such an
evidentiary hearing.
A Notice of said hearing is enclosed. The Court has set aside
two hours for this hearing, which would include not only testimony
sought to be elicited and cross-examination to be performed, but
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also any final remarks of counsel regarding the reasonableness of
the fees.

The question of entitlement has already been answered.

Counsel for plaintiff Rite Aid is to prepare an Order in
conformity with this Minute Entry decisaon, and submit the same to
the Court for review and signature i*l accordance with the Code of
Judicial Administration.

/

Stephen G. Morgan (No. 2315)
Cynthia K.C. Meyer (No. 5050)
MORGAN, MEYER & RICE, L.C.
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888
Facsimile: (801) 531-9732
Bruce Wycoff (No. 4448)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:
(801) 521-3200
Facsimile: (801) 328-0537
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a
California corporation, d/b/a
RITE AID,
Plaintiff,
v.

>
:

HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD., a
California limited partnership, .
d/b/a HILLSIDE PLAZA
PROPERTIES, and COLLIERS
[
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, a Utah
general partnership,
Defendants.

HILLSIDE PLAZA, LTD., a
California limited partnership
d/b/a/ HILLSIDE PLAZA
532686v2
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:
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 000910098

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

PROPERTIES,
Plaintiff,
v,
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a
California corporation d/b/a/
RITE AID; and AMERICAN DRUG
STORES, INC., an Illinois
corporation,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

The Court conducted a bench trial of this matter beginning
March 18, 2002. Plaintiff/Counterdefendants, Thrifty Payless, Inc.
("Thrifty")and Rite Aid Corporation

("Rite Aid"),

along with

Counterdefendant American Drug Stores ("ADS"), appeared personally
and through their counsel of record, Cynthia K. C. Meyer of Morgan,
Meyer, and Rice, L.C., and Bruce Wycoff of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook
& McDonough.

Defendant/Counterclaimant, Hillside Plaza, Ltd.

("Hillside") , appeared personally

and through its counsel of

record, Scott 0. Mercer and Ryan Hancey, of Kesler 6c Rust.
The Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses, having
observed their demeanor and credibility, having carefully read the
trial memoranda submitted by the parties, and being fully apprised
in the matter, hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
532686V2
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Parties
1.

Thrifty is a California Corporation with it principal

place of business in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
2.

Rite Aid is a Delaware Corporation with its principal

place of business in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
3.

Thrifty

Corporation.

is a wholly

owned

subsidiary

of Rite Aid

(Hereafter, the Court will refer to Thrifty and Rite

Aid collectively as "Rite Aid").
4.

Hillside

is

a

California

limited

partnership

that

regularly conducts business in Salt Lake County, Utah.
5.

On or about May 6, 1974, Hillside Plaza Associates

("HPA"), as landlord, entered into a written Lease Agreement (the
"Lease"), with Skaggs Companies, Inc. ("Skaggs"), as tenant, in
which HPA leased to Skaggs retail space located at 2378 East 7000
South, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Property")
6.

Rite Aid is the successor-in-interest to Skaggs.

7.

Hillside is the successor-in-interest to HPA.

8.

ADS,

a

previous

successor-in-interest

to

Skaggs,

guaranteed the performance under the Lease of any successors to,
assignees of, or subtenants under, its interests.
Factual Background
9532686v2

The original Lease term began on October 6, 1975, and was
3

to expire on January 31, 2001 unless Rire Aid gave Hillside timely
written notice of Rite Aid's intent ro renew the Lease.
10.

At some point not disclosed by the record, Hillside hired

Commerce Properties Management Corporation

PCPMG") to perform

property management functions for the Property.
11.

On March 19, 1992, CPMG sent a form letter (Trial Exhibit

2) giving Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest the following notice:
Many of you have continued to deliver rental payments and
other mail to our former address. Effective March 20,
1992 our brokerage company is moving from their location
at 275 East S. Temple to their new offices. In the
future all rental payments and mail for [CPMG] should be
addressed as follows:
Hillside Plaza Limited
Commerce Properties Management Corp.
5282 South 320 West, Suite D-100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
(Emphasis added)
12.

On September 2, 1996 Hillside Management, an assumed name

of an entity legally distinct from Hillside, which has no common
owners, sent a form letter

(^Hillside's 1996 Letter")

(Trial

Exhibit 3) to Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest. Trial Exhibit 3
recites that >Nthe property management responsibilities for Hillside
Plaza Shopping Center have been assumed by Annette Johnson of
Hillside Management."

Exhibit 3 contained the following notice:

For the month of September, 1996, [CPMG] will forward
532686v2
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your rental payment to Hillside Management.
mail your future rent payments as follows:

Please

Hillside Plaza Shopping Center
c/o Hillside Management
P.O. Box 900511
Sandy, Utah 84 090
Your rental payments should be made in accordance with
the terms of your lease and must be received no later
than the date specified in your lease.
(Emphasis added)
13.

Although

Exhibit

3 was not

sent by

registered

or

certified mail, Rite Aid's predecessor-in-interest received and
acted on the letter soon after September 2, 1996, and placed the
letter in its lease file.
14.

Unlike Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3 gave no change of address

instructions for NXmail" or ^other mail".
address change to xxrent" and
15.

It expressly limited the

NN

rental" payments.

In fact, by the date of Exhibit 3, Hillside had relieved

CPMG of all property management duties, and had transferred all
those duties to Hillside Management, a legally separate entity from
Hillside.
16.

On March 21, 1997 Rite Aid wrote Hillside, requesting

that all future legal notices be sent to one address, and that all
future non-leaal correspondence such as billings be sent to a
different address.
532686v2

(Trial Exhibit 4)
5

17.

Because Exhibit 4 was a legal notice, Rite Aid sent it to

the address it had used for general, non-rental, mail before
receipt of Exhibit 3: Hillside, c/o CPMG, 5282 South 320 West, Ste
D, Salt Lake City, Utah 841070000.
18.

Rite Aid's legal notice regarding its change of address

reached Hillside shortly after March 21, 1997.
19.

The Lease further provides, at 1(2):

OPTION TO EXTEND: Tenant, at its option may extend the
term of this Lease for not to exceed four separate and
additional consecutive periods of 5 years each. Each
such extension shall be exercised by giving written
notice to Landlord at least 180 days prior to the
expiration of the original term hereof or any such
extended term. Upon such exercise, this Lease and the
Lease Agreement shall be deemed to be extended without
the execution of any further lease of other instrument.
Consequently, Rite Aid had to give Landlord written notice of Rite
Aid's exercise of the Option, and renewal not later than August 4,
2000, the date 180 days before January 31, 2002.
20.

Accordingly, on June 21, 2000, Rite Aid sent, via

certified mail, return receipt requested, its notice of renewal of
the Lease (Trial Exhibit 5) to the same address it had used for its
March 21, 1997 letter (Exhibit 4): Hillside, c/o CPMG, 5282 South
320 West, Suite D, Salt Lake City, UT 84107.

532686v2

21.

CPMG received the letter on June 29, 2000.

22.

CPMG personnel "probably" or "likely" forwarded Exhibit
6

5 to Hillside Management.
23.

Sometime after the August 4, 2001 renewal date had

passed, Hillside, through counsel, advised Rite Aid's counsel,
Cynthia Meyer, that Rite Aid had failed to exercise the Option as
the Lease required.
24.

Trial Exhibit 55 contains a January 21, 1997 letter from

Annette Johnson of Hillside Management to Lu Strong of Rite Aid's
predecessor-in-interest (the "January 21, 1997 Letter") .
25.

At trial, Hillside presented no competent evidence that

Hillside Management ever sent the January 21, 1997 Letter to Rite
Aid or to anyone else.
26.

Hillside offered no evidence nor excuse explaining or

justifying Annette Johnson's failure to testify at trial.
27.

The Court has great concern regarding the authenticity of

the January 21, 1997 Letter; in any event, Hillside has not met its
burden of proving that Hillside Management sent that letter* As a
result, the Court will disregard it.
Rite Aid Strictly Complied With Option Exercise Requirements
28.

In writing Exhibit 3, Hillside Management intended to

change the mailing address for all purposes from CPMG to Hillside
Management; Exhibit 3, however, does not express that intention.
29.
532686v2

Rite Aid was unaware of this intention until after August:
7

4, 2000, the deadline for Rite Aidfs Option exercise.
30.

Because it changed the address for legal notice only on

its PIMS system, leaving the address for other correspondence
unchanged, it is clear that Rite Aid' s predecessor-in-interest read
Exhibit 3 as changing the address

for rent and rent-related

activities only, leaving unaffected

the address contained in

Exhibit 2 for correspondence not involving rent and rent-related
activities.
31.

It is not uncommon in the commercial leasing industry for

landlords and tenants to establish multiple addresses for various
types of correspondence.
32.

The Phrase "property management7' does not have any

standard or generally recognized meaning in the commercial leasing
industry.
33.

The phrase "property management" may or may not mean

"all" activities involving the managed property.
34.

Under the evidence admitted at trial, it is of really

small moment 'whether Rite Aid read Exhibit 3 or not prior to
sending Exhibit 5, because Exhibit 3 makes reference only to the
address for "rent", and not to other types of correspondence, and
therefore changed the address for rent only.
35.
532686v2

Rite Aid's interpretation of Exhibit 3 as affecting only
8

the

address

for

rent

and

rent-related

correspondence

was

reasonable.
36-

Hillside presented no evidence establishing that Rite Aid

should be charged with knowledge of its or Hillside Management's
unexpressed intent.
37.

It would not have been difficult for Hillside Management

to have a written a letter that clearly and unequivocally changed
the address for all types of notice; indeed its purported January
21, 1997 Letter accomplished that purpose38.

The Court is not impressed with Hillside's arguments that

it repeatedly sent correspondence to Rite Aid containing the Sandy
post office box address because such correspondence was rentrelated/ and in many cases merely requested that Rite Aid remit
monies to the listed address.
39.

To the extent Hillside wanted Rite Aid to correct the

address it was using, Hillside provided no explanation of its
failure ever to send any change of address notice to Rite Aid at
the address it had specified in Exhibit 4 as applying to legal
notices (Attention: Secretary, Post Office Box 3165, Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania).
Mistake
40.
532686v2

Alternatively, Rite Aid interpreted Exhibit 3 in a manner
9

inconsistent wirh Hillside Management's intention.

with

41.

Hillside Management prepared Exhibit 3.

42.

The change-of-address portion of Exhibit 3 deals only

xx

rent" or ^rental".

43.

Hillside Management accordingly caused any confusion

inherent in Exhibit 3.
44.

It is not reasonable under the circumstances to charge

Rite Aid with knowledge of what was in Hillside Management's mind.
45.

To the extent Rite Aid addressed Exhibit 5 to the wrong

address, that error was the result of a honest and justifiable
mistake in interpreting Exhibit 3.
46.

No trial evidence showed that Rite Aid was negligent in

exercising the Option to renew the Lease.
The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact, now enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Having made the foregoing factual findings, the Court has
determined that they support the following legal conclusions, or
that it is appropriate to make the following conclusions as a
matter of law:
1.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this

matter and personal jurisdiction over the parties.
532686v2
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2.

At trial, Hillside relied on The January 21, 1997 Letter

which, as a matter of law, would have been dispositive of the
issues at trial in favor of Hillside if Hillside could establish
that it sent it to Rite Aidf s predecessor, and that Rite Aid's
predecessor had received it.
3.

The

burden

is

on

Hillside

to

show

that

Hillside

Management sent the January 21, 1997 Letter; the burden is not on
Rite Aid to show that Hillside Management did not send it or that
Rite Aid's predecessor did not receive it.
4.

There is no presumption of mailing; to the contrary the

law is explicit regarding the evidence necessary to establish
mailing.
5.

The January 21, 1997 Letter is legally entitled to no

weight.
6.

The effectiveness of Exhibit 5 to exercise Rite Aid's

option to renew the Lease (the "Option") therefore rises or falls
with Exhibit 3.
7.

As

the

January

21,

1997

Letter

shows,

Hillside

Management, as the agent for Hillside, had the ability to express
in Exhibit 3 with reasonable clarity what Hillside Management
intended.
8.
532686v2

Nothing in the Lease prevented Rite Aid or Hillside in
1 1

having multiple addresses for different purposes.
9.

Rite Aid was obligated to strictly comply with the

Lease's Option and renewal provisions.
10.

By sending Exhibit 5 to the address it did, Rite Aid

strictly complied with the Lease's Option and renewal provisions;
if Rite Aid had sent Exhibit 5 to Hillside Management at the
address shown in Exhibit 3, Hillside could have argued that Rite
Aid had not strictly complied with Exhibit 3.
11.

Exhibit 3 does not substantially comply with the Lease's

provisions for changing the address for legal notices because it
changes the address for rent only.
12.

Alternatively, to the extent Rire Aid was mistaken in its

interpretation of Exhibit 3, that mistake is equitably excused
under the foregoing factual circumstances.
13.

Exhibit 3 is not ambiguous.

It says send rent payments

to the new address. Rite Aid did that.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the Court orders as follows:
1.

Rite Aid effectively renewed the Lease for an additional

five-year term.
2.
532686v2

Rite Aid is entitled to the quiet and peaceful possession
12

of the Property to the extent set forth in the Lease.
3.

Hillside shall take nothing by its Complaint- All claims

that Hillside raised, or could have raised through the date of the
trial in this matter, are hereby dismissed with prejudice and on
the merits.
4.

The Third District Court Clerk shall immediately release

all cash or possession bonds Rite Aid has filed or deposited with
the Clerk in connection with these consolidated actions.
5.

The

Court expressly

reserves

ruling

on Rite Aid's

entitlement to attorney fees, and amount of those fees, until Rite
Aid has properly brought the matter before the Court pursuant to
the provisions of Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-505.
6.

Pursuant to ProMax Development

Corp. v. Railer

998 P.2d

254,. I 15 (Utah 2000), this Order is not final for purposes of
appeal until this Court has disposed of the reserved attorney fee
issue.
DATED: April

, 2002.
BY THE COURT

Timothy R. Hanson
T h i r d D i s t r i c t Court Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT 07 THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a
California corporation, dba
RITE AID,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO.

000910098

Plaintiff,
vs.
HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD., a
California limited partnership,
dba HILLSIDE PLAZA PROPERTIES,
and COLLIERS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
a Utah general partnership,
Defendants.
HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD., a
California limited partnership,
dba HILLSIDE PLAZA PROPERTIES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a
California corporation, dba
RITE AID; and AMERICAN DRUG
STORES, INC., an Illinois
corporation,
Defendants.

The Court has before it a request for decision filed by
Hillside seeking a ruling on its Memorandum Opposing Award of
Attorney's Fees to Rite Aid. The Court notes that it in a previous
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ruling, the Court rejected Hillside's argument that Rite Aid was
not entitled to attorney's fees.
June 17, 2002).

(See Minute Entry decision of

In that same ruling, the Court indicated that it

would schedule an evidentiary hearing for Hillside to dispute the
reasonableness of the fees being sought, either through crossexamination

or

through

testimony.

After

this

hearing

was

scheduled, the parties stipulated to forego an evidentiary hearing
and instead filed a Stipulation Concerning Attorney Fees.
In is Memorandum Opposing the award of attorney's fees,
Hillside renews its argument that the fees being sought by Rite Aid
are excessive and unreasonable.

According to Hillside, the sheer

amount of the fees being sought and the fact that Rite Aid employed
two firms conclusively proves that the attorneys involved were
inefficient in litigating a case that was not complex and did not
involve novel legal issues.
The Court agrees with Rite Aid that Hillside merely relies on
its own assertion that the fees requested are too high, without
providing any evidence to support its argument. The Court intended
that the evidence to support this argument be established during
the evidentiary hearing, which Hillside voluntarily waived.

In

the absence of concrete evidence to dispute the reasonableness of
the fees involved, Hillside falls back on a comparison of the fees
expended by both sides and the assertion that hirina fw^ -F«;>-~~
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(even if both bring a unique background or expertise to the matter)
is a "nonessential luxury."
that these

The Court disagrees and concludes

factors prove nothing

reasonableness.

in terms of efficiency

or

Without more, Hillsidefs opposition lacks amy

legal basis for the Court to reduce the amount of fees being
sought.

Accordingly, the Court denies Hillside's Opposition and

awards the full amount of fees sought by Rite Aid.
Counsel for Rite Aid is to prepare an Order consistent with
this Minute Entry decision and submit the same to the Court for
review and signature.
Dated this <v^jay of December, 2002.

TIMOTHY K. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER, No. 5050
MORGAN, MINNOCK & RICE, L.C.
136 South Main Street, Ste. 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888
Facsimile: (801) 531-9732
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BRUCE WYCOFF, No. 4448
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
Facsimile: (801) 328-0537

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC.,
a California corporation d/b/a RITE AID;
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
HILLSIDE PLAZA LTD., a California
partnership, d/b/a HILLSIDE PLAZA
PROPERTIES, and COLLIER'S
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, a Utah
general partnership;
Defendants.
HILLSIDE PLAZA, LTD., a California
partnership d/b/a/ HILLSIDE PLAZA
PROPERTIES,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 000910098
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., a California
corporation d/b/a/ RITE AID; and
AMERICAN DRUG STORES, INC.,
an Illinois corporation,

:
:
:

Defendants.

:

The Court, having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and its
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Award ofAttorneys' Fees, Costs and Expert Fees and Denying
Hillside's Opposition Thereto, hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows:
1. Defendant Hillside Plaza Ltd.'s Counterclaim be, and the same is, dismissed with
prejudice and on the merits; and
2. Plaintiff Thrifty Payless, Inc. be, and the same is, hereby awarded judgment in the amount
of $85,511.75 for attorneys' fees and $9,472.38 for costs and expert witness fees, for a total of
$94,984.13; said judgment to bear interest at the rate of 7.3 % per annum until paid.

DATED this 2fL day of

J)&'^

2003.
BY THE COURT:

TIMCDTHYR. HANSON
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

/Scotttl Mercer
lg23»©, Hancey
Attorneys for Defendant Hillside Plaza Ltd.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

Y

day of January, 2003,1 caused the original of the

foregoing proposed JUDGMENT to be mailed via first class mail, postage pre-paid, to the following
for his approval as to form:
Scott O. Mercer
Ryan B. Hancey
KESLER&RUST
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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